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HELEN INGRAM
DAVID R. WHITE*
International Boundary
and Water Commission:
An Institutional Mismatch
for Resolving Transboundary
Water Problems
INTRODUCTION
The International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) of
the United States and Mexico is an institution designed to facilitate joint
action while protecting national sovereignty. The IBWC has two commis-
sioners, one from each country, each of whom heads a separate adminis-
trative section. Each section represents the interests of its own country and
is responsible to its own government. While actions are taken jointly, each
section develops its negotiating position through the political processes of
its own country. The IBWC thus facilitates parallel national action on
water related problems occurring between the two nations.
At a time when nationalism appears to be on the ascendancy
throughout the world, it may be that the IBWC can provide a useful model
for other nations that share borders. The breakup of the Soviet Union and
other countries has created many new boundaries, each with its attendant
transboundary resource management problems.' The IBWC is exemplary
in that it has officiated over the peaceful settlement of many disputes since
it was founded over a century ago.
However, the IBWC is a low visibility institution which usually
operates at technical and bureaucratic governmental levels. While differ-
ent from and preferable to unilateral action in response to shared prob-
lems, the parallel national actions undertaken by the IBWC fall
considerably short of true binationalism. In recent years the IBWC has
received criticism for its failure to aggressively address problems before
they become critical, for failure to be environmentally sensitive, and for
failure to include state and local governments and nongovernmental orga-
*Helen Ingram is Director of the Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy at the Univer-
sity of Arizona. David R. White is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Political Science at
the University of Arizona.
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nizations (NGOs) in its decisionmaking processes.2 The purpose of this
article is to assess the performance of the IBWC on the basis of its estab-
lished record in resolving water problems.
To be considered a success the IBWC must demonstrate a record
of addressing past problems and rendering them more tractable, so that
they are closer to resolution today than when they first emerged. Further,
the IBWC must demonstrate not only resiliency but flexibility; the longev-
ity of an institution can sometimes lead to greater legitimacy, but some
organizational theorists believe that agencies exhibit natural life cycles
and will decline over time.3 The United States-Mexico border region is
changing rapidly, and new transboundary resource management chal-
lenges are being created. At this critical time, it is important to evaluate
whether this historic institution can successfully adjust to these changes.
This article will first review previous scholarly and professional
evaluations of the IBWC, and more specifically the Commission's United
States Section, particularly in relation to the latter institution's ability to
respond to state and local problems. The positive and negative aspects of
its institutional design and general performance will be identified. Fol-
lowing the literature review, the article will turn to an in-depth evaluation
of the IBWC's record in relation to water problems at a particular location
on the border, as the strengths and weaknesses of the United States Sec-
tion's performance in the neighboring cities of Nogales, Arizona, and
Nogales, Sonora, (referred to jointly as Ambos Nogales) are assessed.
Finally, the chapter will provide an evaluation of the parallel national
approach employed by the IBWC, and recommend the sort of institutional
changes that will be needed in the future.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Authoritative scholars of the IBWC have called the agency one of
the most prestigious international resource management agencies in the
world.4 The source of its United States Section's strength is thought to be
its autonomy from the executive branch, similar to the autonomy exhib-
ited by the United States Army Corps of Engineers in the 1950s. Like the
Corps, the United States Section has essentially been an engineering arm
2. S. Mumme, New Directions in U.S.-Mexican Transboundary Management: A Critique
of Current Proposals, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Ass'n of Borderlands
Scholars and the Western Social Science Ass'n (Apr. 23-25,1992)( Denver, CO.).
3. S. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads and the Public Inter-
est, 61 Yale L. J. 467 (1952); M. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission
(1955).
4. S. Mumme & S. Moore, Agency Autonomy in Transboundary Resource Management: The
United States Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mex-
ico, 30 Nat. Res. J. 661 (1990),
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of Congress, although its operations have been confined to the area of the
United States-Mexico border. The United States Section has served the
constituency needs of members of Congress by constructing projects that
are visible symbols of the members' ability to "bring home the bacon"
from Washington. This special relationship with Congress has enabled the
IBWC to be quasi-independent of the Department of State, just as the
Corps of Engineers has been able to assert its independence from the
Department of Defense.5
Another source of autonomy has been the IBWC's technical
expertise. The technical cast of the Commission is apparent in the require-
ment that each Commissioner be an engineer. This expertise is bolstered
by the Commission's virtual monopoly over border resources data acqui-
sition, and by the 1944 United States-Mexican water allocation treaty that
made the United States Section the formal conduit of information regard-
ing the Mexican federal authorities' desires and intentions with respect to
solving border water problems.
6
While the literature has stressed that the United States Section has
a good deal of autonomy and independence from the federal executive
branch, writers have also found that the agency is closely tied to munici-
palities, states, and their representatives in Congress Among border
states, Texas has exerted particular influence. The central office of the
IBWC's United States Section is in El Paso, and the Texas congressional
delegation has usually gotten at least veto power over the President's
selection of the next United States Section Commissioner. One Congress-
man, Representative Rooney from Brooklyn, was fond of calling the IBWC
the "Texas Boundary and Water Commission."8
These sources of power upon which the United States Section of
the IBWC has drawn has enabled it to avoid politicization and predation
by other United States federal agencies. 9 A price has been exacted in
exchange, however. Border states and their congressional delegations
have been able to exercise a "state veto" over international initiatives of
the United States Section, 10 and there are other further politically imposed
limits to what the IBWC is able to do. Assessing its strategies in 1986,
5. J. Nienaber Clarke & D. McCool, Staking Out the Terrain: Power Differential Among
Natural Resources Management Agencies (1985).
6. Treaty Regarding Utilization of Waters of Colorado and lijuana Rivers and of the Rio
Grande, Feb. 3,1944, U. S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219.
7. H. Ingram & S. Fiederlein, Traversing Boundaries: A Public Policy Approach to the Analysis
of Foreign Policy, 41 W. Pol. Q. 725 (1988).
8. A. Utton, Book Review, Statecraft, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy Making: The Cham-
izal Dispute, 31 Nat. Res. J. 255 (1991).
9. Mumme & Moore, supra note 4, at 678-80.
10. S. Mumme, Regional Power in National Diplomacy: The Case of the U.S. Section of the Inter-
national Boundary and Water Commission, 14 Publius 115 (1984).
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Mumme wrote that the IBWC was likely to react very conservatively to
opportunities to expand its functions or jurisdiction:
First, the Commission cannot be expected to be ven-
turesome in promoting the expansion of its water man-
agement functions, even though it is perhaps the best
situated and most authoritative agency capable of
advancing such recommendations .... Second, it is
likely to be very reluctant to take upon itself functions
that can just as well be conducted by some other
agency or set of agencies in each country ... Third, the
Commission is likely to resist, as it has in the past, set-
ting fixed priorities and developing a long term list of
management objectives in the water management and
environmental spheres.11
The tendency of the United States Section to move cautiously has
generated recent literature written by both scholars and activists which is
highly critical of the IBWC. Among the charges brought against the
agency are that: it is slow in exercising functions related to water quality;
it is stodgy or conservative in responding to environmental pressures; it is
overly concerned with secrecy and reluctant to disclose information; and
that it has failed to involve the public in its decisionmaking processes. 12
These recent criticisms have presented the agency with new and
unfamiliar challenges. Some supporters of the Commission believe that it
will be able to rise to the challenge by making incremental changes to its
policies and procedures. A determination of whether or not the IBWC has
been successful in solving actual or emergent water problems, or is likely
to make changes in response to recent criticism, is best made in the context
of demonstrated practice. To make such an assessment it is necessary to
examine a specific case in more depth.
AMBOS NOGALES
The Problem
Ambos Nogales is located in a small, narrow valley which is trib-
utary to the Santa Cruz River. The Santa Cruz River has its headwaters
just north of the border in the United States, but then flows south into
Mexico before curving around to the west and then flowing north back
across the border and beyond. Nogales is bordered by numerous hills,
especially at the higher, southern end of the valley where the hills are
11. S. Mumme, Engineering Diplomacy: The Evolving Role of the International Boundary and
Water Commission in U.S.-Mexican Water Management, 1 J. Borderlands Stud. 73,90 (1986).
12. Mumme, supra note 2, at 3.
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quite steep. The valley and surrounding hills are drained by the Nogales
Wash and its numerous tributaries. During the course of its 16-mile jour-
ney to the Santa Cruz, the Nogales Wash flows through the heart of down-
town Ambos Nogales only a few hundred yards from the community's
largest automobile and pedestrian border crossing. Because the valley is
bisected by the United States-Mexico border, water flowing through the
valley flows not only downhill, but across national and state boundaries.
The local topography and patterns of settlement have combined
to produce severe water quality problems. The population on the Sonoran
side of the border has grown dramatically, most recently in response to
border industrialization, at rates which have outstripped development of
that city's urban infrastructure. Thousands of makeshift dwellings have
been built on the steep hills and arroyos surrounding the valley, beyond
the limits of municipal water supply, wastewater collection, and garbage
removal services. Heavy rainfall and subsequent runoff causes sewage
and other contaminants to be washed down from the hills, through neigh-
borhoods and commercial districts on both sides of the border, and even-
tually into the Nogales Wash. The problem is especially severe during the
monsoon storms of July and August, when the region typically receives
over 50 percent of its annual rainfall.
Ambos Nogales also has water supply problems, although so far
shortages have been restricted to the Sonoran side. For most of Nogales,
Sonora's publicly supplied water is drawn from 12 major wells and an
infiltration gallery in a shallow aquifer underlying the Santa Cruz River
several miles southeast of the city, and from 14 smaller wells in aquifers
underlying the Nogales Wash and its tributaries within the city. Produc-
tion from the Santa Cruz wells has fallen drastically during periods of
drought, which has left the population on the Sonoran side of the border
vulnerable to water supply shortages. Most recently, water service was
severely interrupted during the summer of 1989.13 Since 1991, Nogales,
Sonora has also received water that has been piped in from the new "Los
Alisos" well field 20 miles south of the city in the neighboring Rio
Magdalena watershed. An unknown but presumably much smaller quan-
tity of water is obtained by owners of private wells within the city.
The potable water supply for the much smaller population on the
Arizona side of the border has been more reliable. The two primary
sources of water are a series of wells in the aquifer underlying the Santa
Cruz River several miles northeast of the city, and wells in an aquifer
underlying a tributary of Nogales Wash on the northwest outskirts of the
city. The effect of Sonora's upstream groundwater withdrawals on the
13. H. Ingram & R. Varady, The Sonoran Pimeria Alta: Shared Environmental Problems
and Challenges, Paper Presented at Conference "500 Years After the Meeting of TWo Worlds
-A Cultural Legacy in Pimeria Alta, Nogales," (Jan. 25,1992) (Sonora).
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productivity of Arizona's Santa Cruz wells is unclear, though unlike the
wells in Sonora the Arizona wells have never run dry. Residents on the
Arizona side of the border also receive water from public and private
wells in the aquifer underlying Nogales Wash, though this water is gener-
ally used only for nonpotable purposes.
Flooding, Drainage, and Sewerage
For over 50 years the City of Nogales, Arizona has looked to its
congressional delegation and the United States Section of the IBWC to
solve its flooding, drainage, and wastewater problems. For example, in
response to fatal, damaging floods in 1931, the Mayor of Nogales wrote to
Congressman Lewis Douglas and Senator Carl Hayden asking that the
governments of the United States and Mexico take steps to eliminate the
flood hazard facing the two cities.14 In turn, Arizona members of Congress
contacted Secretary of State H. L Stimson. Stimson replied that United
States Section Commissioner L. M. Lawson would visit Ambos Nogales
soon with his Mexican counterpart, and suggested that the congressmen
advise Arizona's governor of the impending IBWC investigative trip.
15
The eventual results of this and other meetings were a series of storm
drains, channels, and flood control conduits aimed at keeping the water
within its banks on both sides of the border. An unintended consequence
of these measures was that stormwater collectors and channels facilitated
the flow of water, including contaminants, across the boundary even dur-
ing normal flow conditions.
Residents on the Arizona side of the border followed a similar
path when sewerage problems became a priority several years later, as
seen in a telling piece of evidence found in the papers of Arizona Senator
Carl Hayden. A 1946 letter indicates that city officials contacted their con-
gressional delegation and the United States Commissioner directly, with
state officials becoming involved only when they were asked to provide
supporting documentation. A sanitary engineer at the Arizona Depart-
ment of Health hurriedly prepared a report on sanitary problems in
response to a telegram signed by the entire Arizona congressional delega-
tion and submitted the report directly to the United States Commissioner.
Because the situation the engineer observed in 1946 so closely parallels
that observed more recently, parts of the report are useful to quote at
length:
The twin cities of Nogales, Arizona and Nogales,
Sonora should be considered, from a public health
14. Letter from H. Kams to L. Douglas (Jan. 21, 1931) (Pimeria Alta Historical Society
Files) (Nogales, AZ, Folder City Archives/Flood Control Project)[hereinafter PAHS Files].
15. Letter from H. Stimson to C. Hayden (Jan. 30,1931); Letter from H. Stimson to L. Dou-
glas (Jan. 30,1931) (available from PAHS Files).
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standpoint, as a single community, for the only line of
demarcation between the two communities is the
international boundary line. Nogales [Arizona], there-
fore, for the purpose of this report, has an over-all pop-
ulation of 30,000. Imports, exports, and tourists are the
principal industries of this community. As far as the
boundary line is concerned, the local population goes
back and forth routinely. Food is purchased from
sources on both sides of the line for use in either one or
the other or both communities....
Of this population of approximately 30,000 only 25
percent is sewered, and this chiefly in Nogales, Ari-
zona, with only a few down town business houses in
Nogales, Sonora connected to a short special sewer line
which terminates in the Nogales, Arizona system.
Nogales, Arizona, considered by itself is practically
100 percent sewered. Considering Nogales, Sonora,
disposal in this community is chiefly by means of
unsanitary outdoor privies .... Occasionally in the past
it has been noted by local health authorities that
domestic sewage has been drained directly into the
international storm drain.... The situation then is this,
that the sewage disposal south of the border is on top
of an impervious rock foundation permitting, during
the rainy season at least, drainage of contaminating
material to the storm drain, and down the streets on
both sides of the line toward the Santa Cruz River.
This, of course, creates a definite public health hazard
to the population on both sides of the line of this
important community....
The principal source of water for both sides of the line
has been the Nogales, Arizona water plant and system
which has a pumping rate of approximately 750 gal-
lons per minute. The majority of this water is used on
the United States side of the line. South of the line,
water service lines are not extensive. The consumption
of water in Nogales, Sonora is at the present time at a
minimum because of the lack of adequate water ser-
vice systems at all homes. Here again the down town
business houses are the principal consumers. The
majority of the public obtain their water for domestic
use in buckets. The picture, however, will change for
the water project south of the line [which included sev-
eral wells and the original infiltration gallery at the
Santa Cruz River] is at this writing 50 percent com-
pleted .... Here again a sanitary problem will be aggra-
vated in that water consumption will be definitely
Winter 1993]
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increased because of the installation of water facilities,
resulting in the production of a tremendous amount of
liquid waste in comparison to that in existence up to
now.
16
The state engineer further pointed to the adverse health effects of
the existing sanitary problems. Several cases of typhoid and dysentery
had been reported in Santa Cruz County, the numbers of such illnesses ris-
ing during the rainy season. The report included a statement saying that
the Arizona Department of Health had for some years been advocating "a
single sewerage system and disposal plant [for the entire town] which
would most efficiently and economically handle the situation." 17 The
report concluded it "is urgently recommended that since this apparently
is an international problem as well, that adequate means be provided to
effectively solve the situation."
18
The strength of the ties between the congressional delegation,
local officials, and the United States Section is illustrated by the state san-
itary engineer's report. Clearly, the state was being asked to provide rea-
sons for something that the congressional delegation and the United
States Section had already decided to support. Through its reference to the
situation as an "international problem" the letter also helps to explain
why local officials sought aid through the congressional-United States
Section connection.
The report said that for most purposes Ambos Nogales should be
considered a single community with open communication. While the
IBWC had previously been asked to help with flood control, the two com-
munities had jointly solved a number of other water-related issues with-
out outside help. As the letter indicated, the two communities had up
until that time a single water supply system serving downtown busi-
nesses and other residents. Further, many of these same businesses were
connected to the Nogales, Arizona wastewater treatment plant. These
solutions seem to have been worked out without resort to international
decisionmaking, and without seeking the permission of higher authori-
ties. Therefore, the existence of an international boundary had not in the
past prevented the implementation of binational responses forged at the
local level.
Representing community water issues as international issues pro-
vided advantages far beyond the facilitation of cooperation and agree-
ment, which the Nogales community appeared quite capable of forging on
16. Report: Sanitary Sewage Disposal Problem, Nogales, Sonora, Mex.-Nogales, Arizona,
U.S.A., Sanitary Engineering Div., Ariz. State Dep't of Health, at 1-5 (Feb. 7,1946), (Carl Hay-
den Papers, Dep't of Archives and Manuscripts, Univ. Libraries, Ariz. State Univ., Tempe,
Arizona, Box 255, Folder 52)[hereinafter Hayden Papers].
17. Id. at 8.
18. Id.
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its own. The involvement of the IBWC, together with United States con-
gressional appropriations committees, also created a direct pipeline of
funds running from the United States' national treasury to Ambos
Nogales. The availability of federal funds meant that the city of Nogales,
Arizona did not need to compete with other Arizona communities for
scarce wastewater treatment project funding, and also made it possible to
deflect a large portion of the costs to United States taxpayers. A 1949 letter
from the Commissioner of the United States Section of the IBWC to Sena-
tor Hayden after United States funding for the proposed wastewater treat-
ment project had been secured acknowledged the roles of Congress,
Nogales, Arizona, and the IBWC in the funding process:
My Dear Carl:
You will recall that through your good offices there
was set up an item in the Boundary Commission
appropriations for what is known as the Nogales Sani-
tation Project, located in Nogales, Arizona and
Nogales, Sonora.
The project consists of the building of an outfall sewer
extending from a point in Mexico to a point in the
United States about two miles north of the boundary
line, and a disposal plant located in the United States at
the northerly end of the outfall line. The sewerage
from both of the collecting lines to be built in Mexico
and from the existing collecting lines with the United
States will enter the outfall sewer and be conveyed to
the disposal plant. The slope of the topography is from
Mexico to the United States, and therefore the outfall
line and treating plant must be located in the United
States. It is estimated that the total cost of the works
will be around $400,000, of which fifty percent will be
allocated to each nation....
You may be interested I am sure, of the official notice
that we have received from the Mexican Section of this
Commission, that arrangements have been completed
whereby funds needed for Mexico's contribution have
been made available for this Section of the Commis-
sion. Accordingly, I have instructed the engineers of
this Section to complete the plans for the project in
order that construction may be begun at an early date.
You and all concerned, including the Arizona delega-
tion in Congress as well as the officials of the City of
Nogales, are to be congratulated for making funds
available to this Section for the successful working out
Winter 1993]
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of this problem, the solution of which is so necessary to
the health of both cities of Nogales.
19
The United States Congress-United States Section funding con-
duit was to prove valuable for more than just the construction phase of the
wastewater treatment project. The costs of operation and maintenance
were originally to be a local obligation, split between the cities of Nogales,
Arizona, and Nogales, Sonora, in proportion to the share of the effluent
that each city produced. But even before the new plant became opera-
tional in 1951, the mayor of Nogales, Arizona urged Senator Hayden to
find some means to help the city defray its costs of operation. An arrange-
ment that provided partial federal funding of local operation and mainte-
nance obligations had previously been worked out by Senator Hayden
and the IBWC for a wastewater treatment project in the nearby border cit-
ies of Douglas, Arizona, and Agua Prieta, Sonora, and Senator Hayden
was able to push similar legislation through Congress for the benefit of
Nogales, Arizona.2
0
The availability of free engineering services was an additional
benefit to Nogales, and was frequently used. The United States Commis-
sioner explained to Senator Hayden that "[tIhis Commission is now and
has been for some time, set up on an engineering basis. This is necessary
since the problems which are encountered along the international border
require engineering solutions."21 Engineering solutions offered by the
IBWC were employed by the city of Nogales again and again, as mounting
problems regularly outstripped previous solutions.
22
By 1958, just seven years after the first international wastewater
treatment facility was completed, the plant design capacity was being con-
tinuously exceeded and raw sewage was being bypassed into the Nogales
Wash. At first the problem was due to the infiltration of groundwater into
leaky sewer pipes rather than to sewage in excess of plant design, and the
extent of the crisis varied according to whether the weather was wet or
dry. However, in 1963, following increased population growth and atten-
dant increases in the amount of sewage produced by the two cities, the
IBWC recommended construction of a new wastewater treatment facility
at a larger site farther north of the border, as requested by the city of
Nogales, Arizona.
Negotiations for the new facility were prolonged, and the United
States Section was slow to act despite prodding from Arizona's congres-
19. Letter from L. Lawson to C. Hayden Uuly 30, 1949) (Hayden Papers, supra note 16).
20. Letter from J. Robins to C. Hayden (Jan. 4, 1951); Letter from B. Brown, Acting Assis-
tant Secretary of State to T. Conolly, Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (July
13,1951) (Hayden Papers, supra note 16).
21. Letter from L. Lawson to C. Hayden (Mar. 19, 1946) (Hayden Papers, supra note 16).
22. Letter from W. Moore to J. Quigley, Comm'r, Federal Water Pollution Control Admin-
istration (Mar. 29, 1966) (Hayden Papers, supra note 16).
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sional delegation. While the city's relationship with the IBWC held open
the possibility of both action and funding, neither came easily. Eight years
after the first reports of sewage being bypassed by the treatment plant, a
state health official wrote to the Federal Water Pollution Control Adminis-
tration to state that such reports had become increasingly frequent and
that there had been no indication when concrete action would occur.
We recently requested the International Boundary and
Water Commission to provide facilities to at least chlo-
rinate the raw sewage when it is bypassed until new
facilities are provided. We have just received a reply
from Mr. Friedkin [United States Section Commis-
sioner] stating they have no funds which can be
expended for this purpose, and it is the responsibility
of the City of Nogales, Arizona, to provide this treat-
ment.
23
The state official expressed frustration that he could not deal
directly with Sonoran officials and asked that the Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration use its influence with the State Department or
take action itself. Things, he said, were very frustrating because every-
thing must go through the IBWC.24
An agreement between Mexico and the United States was finally
reached in 1967. IBWC Minute 227 provided for construction of an
enlarged international wastewater treatment plant nine miles north of the
border, together with a new trunk line to carry the sewage the additional
distance.2 Sixty percent of the new plant's capacity was allocated to Mex-
ico, but Mexico was asked to pay only the amount that would have been
necessary to expand the plant at the existing site, which amounted to 29
percent of the total cost of the project. Forty-six percent of the cost was
borne by the IBWC's United States Section, 17 percent by the City of
Nogales, Arizona, and eight percent by the United States Environmental
Protection Agency.26
The new facility was completed in 1971. By 1976 the need for fur-
ther expansion was already evident, and once again planning, design, and
negotiations for enlargement of the facility were lengthy and tortuous. In
1986 a formal proposal was made to the Mexican Commissioner from the
United States Section suggesting that both countries expand the Interna-
tional Wastewater Treatment Plant. The Mexican Section replied that it
preferred to use its money to build a new plant on its side of the border.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. IBWC Minute No. 227, Enlargement of the International Facilities for the Treatment of
Nogales, Ariz., and Nogales, Sonora Sewage, El Paso, Tx,( Sep. 5, 1967).
26. Position Paper, Nogales International Wastewater Treatment Plant, Prepared by U.S.
Section, International Boundary and Water Commission, El Paso, Tx, at 3 (Oct. 1987).
Winter 1993]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
United States interests were very much opposed to that idea, and in 1988
convinced the Mexican Section to sign IBWC Minute 276.27 Minute 276
required Mexico to repair leaking sewer lines and build new lines on its
side of the border, and to join the United States in paying for another
expansion of the international wastewater treatment plant. Mexico agreed
to pay $1 million in 10 equal annual installments for plant expansion
while Nogales, Arizona paid over $3 million, the United States Section of
the IBWC paid $5.9 million, and the United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency paid $1.7 million.28
Expansion of the facility began in 1989, but history again repeated
itself as the capacity of the enlarged plant continued to lag behind the rap-
idly expanding waste stream. The plant's design capacity of 15.75 million
gallons per day (mgd) was exceeded during periods of peak usage even
before the facility became fully operational. In addition, the treated efflu-
ent from the plant was not meeting Arizona water quality standards due
to high levels of mercury, cyanide, and other pollutants, presumably due
to the lack of industrial pretreatment of wastes. The city's future growth
was threatened when this failure to meet standards resulted in state action
to suspend new sewer connections in Nogales, Arizona.29
Water Supply
The allocation of water supplies is a highly contentious issue in
the arid West, and states jealously guard their water allocations both from
each other and from the Mexicans. The history of United States-Mexico
negotiations over the allocation and salinity of the Colorado River are
fraught with conflict. 30 Typically the literature portrays the states as
impediments to the equitable apportionment of water with Mexico.31
However, in the case of water allocation decisions related to the Santa
Cruz River watershed, the IBWC has been a reluctant participant as well.
The IBWC's involvement in Ambos Nogales water supply prob-
lems is not as extensive as it is for flooding, drainage, and sewerage prob-
lems. The IBWC did not become involved in the former until the 1950s,
when Mexico began to construct municipal water supply works which
Nogales, Arizona feared would threaten its own water supplies. At that
time a number of Nogales-area interests asked the IBWC's United States
27. IBWC Minute No. 276, Conveyance,Ttreatment and Disposal of Sewage from Nogales,
Ar., and Nogales, Sonora Exceeding the Capacities Allotted to the United States, and Mexico
at the Nogales International Sewage Treatment Plant, Under Minute No. 227, Ciudad Juirez,
Chihuahua, (July 26,1988).
28. These figures were displayed on a sign posted outside the Nogales International
Wastewater Treatment Plant during its most recent expansion (July 1990).
29. Nogales Int'l, Feb. 6, 1991, at 1, col. 1.
30. P. Friedkin, A River No More (1984); M. Jamail & S. Ullery, International Water Use
Relations Along the Sonoran Desert Borderlands (1979).
31. H. Ingram & S. Fiederlein, State Government Official's Role in US/Mexico Transboundary
Resource Issues, 28 Nat. Res. J. 431 (1988).
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Section to investigate the possibility of negotiating an allocation agree-
ment for the waters of the Santa Cruz that would be similar to agreements
dividing the flows of other United States-Mexican rivers.
The IBWC was reluctant to open such negotiations, for reasons
made clear in a frank letter from the United States Section Commissioner
to Senator Hayden.32 The Commissioner indicated that the United States
was already using more than half of all waters derived from the joint
United States/Mexico portion of the Santa Cruz River watershed, despite
the fact that only 34 percent of the drainage area contributing that water
was in United States territory. The Commissioner therefore thought that
Arizona should be very careful about engaging in negotiations on the sub-
ject.
The next year the Commissibner's office of the United States Sec-
tion issued a report which urged that every effort be made to find a United
States solution that could be implemented without negotiation of an inter-
national agreement. Among the suggested possibilities were a pipeline
from the Santa Cruz River before it first crossed into Mexico and a dam on
the United States side near Nogales to catch and store the river's flood
flows.33
In contrast with the position taken by the United States Commis-
sioner, local water interests in Nogales expressed great interest in a bina-
tional solution between the two federal governments. At a high level
meeting in the offices of the Arizona Interstate Stream Commission that
was attended by the United States Section Commissioner, the Chair of the
Santa Cruz Water Users Association spoke about the local view:
We also feel that it might be possible for our State
Department to negotiate some sort of treaty with Mex-
ico to put in a common water supply system for both
cities; ... a common system of withdrawing and dis-
tributing the water, much as they have handled the
sewage and flood control system which has worked
fairly satisfactorily.3
4
To document similar Mexican interest, the chair of the water users
association introduced a letter from the mayor of Nogales, Sonora, to the
chairman of the Santa Cruz River Committee, which stated in part:
32. Letter from L. Lawson to C. Hayden (Oct. 30,1953) (Hayden Papers, supra note 16, at
Box 199, Folder 18).
33. Summary Statement by Office of the Commissioner, United States Section, IBWC,
Santa Cruz River Development-United States and Mexico (Sep. 2, 1954) (Hayden Papers,
supra note 16, at Box 199, Folder 18).
34. Minutes of Meeting Held May 9, 1956, 11:00 a.m. in the Offices of the Arizona Inter-
state Stream Commission, Mayer-Heard Building, Phoenix, Ariz., called for the purpose of
further considering the matter of the Santa Cruz River, at 4 (Hayden Papers, supra note 16, at
Box 199, Folder 18).
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During my incumbency as Mayor of Nogales, Sonora,
and in my present capacity, the future of our city's
water supply has been and is one of my primary con-
cerns. On many different occasions this matter has
been the subject of informal exploratory discussions
with interested friends in Nogales, Arizona.
We have always agreed that the problem is a joint
international one and that a joint solution between our
respective federal governments would provide the
most favorable solution.35
Despite the favorable attitude toward international negotiations
expressed by local interests, such negotiations did not occur. The reasons
are aptly expressed by Arizona Governor McFarland in the meeting min-
utes:
When it comes to negotiating a treaty, it becomes a
Federal and not a State matter. [United States Section
Commissioner] Colonel Hewitt... gave us the definite
impression that if we entered into a treaty we would
get less than we now have.... If we're going to go into
a general proposition whereby the Federal Govern-
ment is going to give up something it wouldn't be very
good for Arizona.36
While no other serious attempt to allocate surface or groundwater
supplies near Ambos Nogales appears in the historical record, water sup-
ply problems, especially in Mexico, have by no means abated. Control of
the treated effluent that emerges from the international wastewater treat-
ment plant, most of which is originally generated in Mexico, has become a
larger issue with each enlargement of the plant. To Sonorans, this water
represents a potential source of water supply that could be used for indus-
trial processes and irrigation.37 Arizonans see the effluent flowing into the
Santa Cruz River from the wastewater treatment plant as the sole source
of water for a thriving riparian area that is an important habitat for wild-
life and which provides many recreational opportunities.
Since at least the early 1960s the Mexican Section of the IBWC has
supported the idea of building a facility on its own side of the border to
treat Sonoran wastewater flows. The idea is attractive to the Mexicans
because the construction funds for such a project would be spent on their
own side of the border, and siting the plant in Sonora would enhance
opportunities to reuse the treated water on that side as well.
35. Id., at 5.
36. Id., at 6.
37. R. Sinchez & F. Lara, Manejo Transfronterizo Del Agua En Los Dos Nogales:
Estrategfas Para Nogales, Sonora, Reporte Tecnico, El Colegio De La Frontera Norte, Tijuana,
Baja California (Junio 1992).
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The United States Section has strongly opposed these plans,
which is part of the reason that negotiations between the two sections of
the IBWC have taken so long. The United States Section has been opposed
in part because the slope of the valley from south to north would require
that the sewage be pumped a considerable distance uphill to the proposed
treatment plant. Breakdowns in the pumping plants, like those that occur
frequently in the Sonoran water supply system, could lead to spills and
renegade sewage flows across the border. 8 Other reasons are also appar-
ent, as the United States Section has argued in the past that
[tihe enlarged plant constructed, operated and main-
tained in this country to provide complete secondary
treatment and disposal in accord with the standards of
the State of Arizona, would assure for the United
States interests satisfactory solution of the serious bor-
der sanitation problem. An incidental advantage
would be the retention of the treated sewage effluent in
the United States for possible utilization.37
So far the United States Section has been successful in its ad hoc
efforts to convince the Mexican Section not to build a separate treatment
plant, even though IBWC Minute 227 specifies that Mexico is the owner of
effluent generated from water south of the border.40 Should the Mexicans
renew their efforts to reclaim the water instead of allowing it to flow to
Arizona, the vital riparian habitat below the international wastewater
treatment facility would be severely harmed. To date, the IBWC has not
taken any initiative to negotiate a long-term agreement on this water sup-
ply issue.
Evaluation of the Problem-Solving Capacity
of the IBWC in Ambos Nogales
While the IBWC has succeeded in bringing some benefits to the
Ambos Nogales area, it would be difficult on the basis of the historical
record to argue that the agency has been successful as a problem solver. It
is true that the IBWC's United States Section has been a conduit of federal
subsidies for flood control and wastewater treatment facilities, but it is by
no means clear that Nogales, Arizona has been the recipient of more fed-
eral subsidies than have other cities that are not associated with the IBWC.
And unlike some cities along the border, Nogales has not profited from
the construction of federally funded dams, desalination facilities, or other
major water works.
38. Position Paper, supra note 26, at 7-8.
39. Nogales Border Sanitation Problem, Memorandum of Current Status and Proposed
Course of Action (May 10,1965) (Hayden Papers,supra note 16, at Box 356, Folder 5).
40. IBWC Minute No. 227, supra note 25.
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Throughout the 1970s and much of the 1980s the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act was also available to provide United States cities the
size of Ambos Nogales with up to 90 percent federal financing for the con-
struction of wastewater treatment facilities. However, it would have been
difficult for Nogales, Arizona to receive adequate funding under this pro-
gram given the conflict between the program's United States targets and
the binational nature of water issues in Ambos Nogales.
It should also be observed that Nogales, Arizona's direct connec-
tion to the IBWC's United States Section through the state's congressional
delegation has allowed the State of Arizona to escape responsibilities it
otherwise would have had to bear. The state has not had to provide fund-
ing for Nogales water projects that it would routinely expect to fund in its
nonborder cities. This has allowed the state to avoid dealing with the bor-
der as a state issue.
It is clear that after 50 years Ambos Nogales has been unable to
transcend the problems introduced by its topography. Water continues to
run downhill, and in Ambos Nogales "running" water means contamina-
tion. The construction of wastewater treatment facilities consistently lags
behind demand, and is increasingly expensive. There is a possibility that
the depletion of the transboundary aquifer will eventually bring water
shortages to Arizona as well as to Sonora. Should the Mexicans choose to
reclaim their wastewater, a valuable riparian habitat will be lost. There is
also evidence to suggest that problems are worsening. Recent tests sug-
gest the existence of a plume of chemical contaminants moving north from
Sonora in the shallow and shared aquifer underlying Nogales Wash.41
Despite the broad jurisdiction of the IBWC, nothing approximat-
ing comprehensive, anticipatory water management has occurred in
Ambos Nogales. The Commission's solutions to problems have been phys-
ical, engineering responses, and these have been implemented only after
problems arise, not before. Remedial responses have not been sufficiently
sensitive to the dynamics of economic and demographic change in the bor-
der region. The IBWC, and particularly the United States Section, have not
correctly anticipated water and sewer needs of Ambos Nogales because it
has not been a participant in the community's planning processes.
The advantages of locating the IBWC at the federal level where
national economic plans and policies are made have not been realized.
There is no evidence that the IBWC has participated in decisions with nat-
ural resource and water implications, including trade and industrializa-
tion decisions that have lured many Mexican workers to the border. There
has been little attempt to make sure that resource limitations are taken into
account when creating policies to ensure that growth is anticipated, or to
secure funding for infrastructure before growth occurs.
41. The Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy, Interim Ambos Nogales Water Resources
Study (Aug. 1990) (unpublished manuscript).
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Another serious consequence of the United States Section's past
performance is the discouragement of grass roots, binational responses to
shared problems. The natural tendency of the residents of Ambos Nogales
to collaborate on important decisions is seldom either appreciated or rein-
forced by the federal agency that takes formalistic stands and keeps neigh-
bors at arm's length. The two cities collaborate informally in fighting
droughts and fires, but when decisions reach a federal level, negotiations
are aimed toward formulating a United States position that leaves out the
Mexicans. Often, as in the case of water supply, the United States federal
position actually works to put the Mexicans at a disadvantage.
It can be argued that the parallel national approach of the IBWC
should at the least build support and consensus for peaceful international
solutions to problems. Whether or not this occurs will depend upon the
agency's assessments of environmental sensitivity, public relations skill,
and openness to public participation, to which our attention now turns.
Incorporating Environmental Concerns and Public Participation
The literature on the IBWC's United States Section suggests that
the agency has historically been an insular organization that has not been
open to public participation. Its interests have been focused on the con-
struction of public works projects rather than on preservation of the envi-
ronment, and, at least until the passage of the National Environmental
Policy Act, its actions were often environmentally insensitive.42 Its orien-
tation has been toward congressional delegations, not to the press or to
nongovernmental organizations.
Organizations can change, however, and so it is worthwhile to
review recent events in Ambos Nogales in order to ascertain the current
flexibility of the IBWC and the United States Section. The foregoing
review of contaminated water flows across the border confirms that the
IBWC had a great deal of experience in working with sewage problems of
the type that occurred in 1990. However, some things in 1990 were quite
different. The level of interest expressed by the local press and the public
was significantly greater, and local officials who were responsible to the
public were less content to patiently wait for action by the IBWC and its
United States Section.
In early April 1990, the Nogales International reported that resi-
dents along the Santa Cruz River were complaining that the river smelled
"like an open sewer."43 The Deputy Director of the Santa Cruz County
Health Department believed the problem was due in part to incompletely
treated sewage effluent entering the river from the international wastewa-
ter treatment plant. Ongoing plant expansion allowed the plant to operate
42. S. Dedina, The Political Ecology of Transboundary Development: Land Use, Flood
Control, and Politics in the ijuana River Valley (1992) (unpublished manuscript).
43. Nogales Int'l, Apr. 4, 1990, at 1, col. 2.
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under less strict state permit requirements." The superintendent of the
plant thought that the smell was instead due to an accumulation of algae
growing in the river. He stated what was needed to alleviate the problem
was "heavy rains to raise the river to a three to five foot flow which would
wash out the weeds and algae." 4
5
Three months later the superintendent's theory was tested when
the area received more than three times its normal precipitation for the
month of july.46 Flooding forced a number of families from their homes,
47
caused sewer lines south of the border to break, and sent flood waters
mixed with contaminants down Nogales Wash toward the Santa Cruz
River.
The Arizona Department of Environmental Quality tested the
flood waters in Nogales Wash and the Santa Cruz River on July 9 and mea-
sured fecal coliform bacteria at 8000 colony-forming units per 100 millili-
ters (8,000 CFU/100 ml), twice the maximum allowed by state standards.
On August 15, after a Sonoran sewage line had broken, the measurement
rose to 1.6 million CFU/100 ml.48 Measurements in September were even
higher, peaking at 16 million CFU/100 ml.49 A Nogales International edito-
rial titled "Dangerous Health Problems" argued the need for immediate
action because "lives depend on it."50 Santa Cruz County passed a resolu-
tion expressing its concern and sent copies to members of Arizona's con-
gressional delegation and other federal officials, including the
Commissioner of the United States Section of the IBWC.
The response from Arizona's congressional delegation was imme-
diate. One congressman reported that in a conversation with the United
States Section Commissioner he had learned that the United States Section
had requested that the Mexican Section immediately repair broken sewer
lines in Sonora. 51 But continuing health fears prompted local and state
officials to take further action. The Santa Cruz County Board of Supervi-
sors and the Nogales City Council each declared a state of emergency. The
Governor of Arizona signed a declaration of emergency and allocated
$50,000 to build a temporary dam for the treatment of contaminated water
in Nogales, Arizona.52 Sandbags filled with chlorine granules were placed
in the Nogales Wash at the boundary and where the concrete channel ends
and widens into a stream.53
44. Id.
45. Nogales Int'l, Apr. 18,1990, at 1, col. 3.
46. Nogales Int'l, Aug. 8,1990, at 12, col. 1.
47. Nogales Int'l, Sep. 19,1990, at 1, col. 1.
48. Nogales Int'l, Aug. 29,1990, at 1, col. 3; Nogales Int'l, Sep. 12, 1990, at 1, col. 4.
49. Nogales Int'l, Oct. 10, 1990, at 1, col. 3.
50. Nogales Int'l, Sep. 19,1990, at 4, col. 1.
51. Id,
52. Arizona Daily Star, Oct. 6, 1990, at 1B, col. 2; Nogales Int'l, Oct. 10, 1990, at 1, col. 3.
53. Arizona Daily Star, Oct. 14,1990, at 5B, col. 3.
[Vol. 33
THE IBWC-AN INSTITUTIONAL MISMATCH
These actions did not completely alleviate mounting public health
concerns, however, as continuing test results indicated conditions
remained that increased the possibility of an outbreak of hepatitis.54 The
$50,000 allocated by the Governor of Arizona did not last long, and by the
end of October funds were nearly gone.
55
Meanwhile, no official word from the IBWC had been received by
local officials in Nogales, Arizona, which prompted the Nogales Interna-
tional reporter covering the story to write a commentary titled "Federal
Agencies Ignoring Nogales."56 The newspaper also editorialized that the
United States Section Commissioner, Narendra N. Gunaji, should be
fired.57 In Washington Commissioner Gunaji met with members of Arizo-
na's congressional delegation, and his office released a statement saying
that "my response to this highly publicized situation has been low-key
because of sensitivity on the treaty matters with Mexico." 58 The United
States Section Secretary, visiting Nogales, remarked that the lack of
response by the IBWC "was blown out of proportion."59
In early November 1990, the United States Section revealed its
proposed solution to the sewage crisis to the congressional delegation.
The plan called for chlorination of the contaminated water crossing the
border in Nogales Wash and for pumping facilities to divert these flows
into the international wastewater treatment plant.60 Within weeks these
actions were implemented.
For several months the water problem appeared to be under con-
trol, but in March 1991, tests in the Nogales Wash showed levels of cya-
nide and mercury which exceeded EPA limits.61 The United States Section
acted positively by forming an Arizona task force which included repre-
sentatives from the governor's office, the Arizona Department of Environ-
mental Quality, the City of Nogales, and Santa Cruz County. The United
States Section convened a meeting with the task force and staff from the
state's congressional delegation in Tucson on March 26,1991 to discuss the
situation.
Several people, including the local press, were not allowed into
the Tucson meeting because, according to an IBWC official, "we'll be dis-
cussing a number of issues including our relationship with Mexico. There
will be sensitive issues discussed." °2 At about the same time the Nogales
International reported that the IBWC was slow to reply to a letter from the
54. Nogales Int'l, Oct. 17,1990, at 12, col. 1.
55. Nogales Int'l, Oct. 24,1990, at 17, col. 1.
56. Nogales Int'l, Oct. 24,1990, at 5, col. 1.
57. Nogales Int'l, Oct. 24,1990, at 4, col. 1.
58. Nogales Int'l, Oct. 31, 1990, at 14, col. 1.
59. Id.
60. Letter from N. Gunaji to D. DeConcini, Sen. from Ariz. (Nov. 9, 1990) (on file with
author).
61. Tucson Citizen, Mar. 27,1991, at 1A, col. 2.
62. Nogales Int'l, Apr. 3, 1991, at 6, col. 1.
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mayor inquiring about the cyanide and mercury problem.63 When the
United States Commissioner explained that his own efforts "are of no
avail, if the Mexicans are not responding to my concerns," this was inter-
preted by the Nogales International as "Mexico bashing," and it aain called
for the United States Commissioner to be removed from office.
The longer range strategy adopted by the United States Section
followed a familiar pattern, as the IBWC once again recommended that
the wastewater treatment facility be enlarged. But this time they recom-
mended that a new treatment facility, perhaps in Mexico but most proba-
bly adjacent to the existing plant, be built to treat only Mexican sewage,
and that the existing plant henceforth be dedicated to treat only United
States wastes. The new plant would use a more sophisticated technology,
and according to United States estimates the construction and modifica-
tion would eventually cost at least $100 million.65 In 1992 the President
included $5 million for this project in the budget he submitted to Con-
gress, but hopes for this solution dimmed when Congress eliminated all
funding for planning and feasibility studies for the project from the 1993
budget.6
6
Evaluation of Recent Environmental and
Public Sensitivity of the IBWC
It would be difficult not to conclude that the United States Section
has had serious public relations problems recently in Ambos Nogales.
There is no doubt that the press and local officials have had a good deal to
do with constructing this problem, and the United States Section did
respond, albeit perhaps with too little care in its choice of words. And in its
defense the United States Section could also cite the usual difficulties
encountered in these types of matters: other crises and projects along the
border also required its attention; there was no money available for a
rapid response because its fiscal year ended five days before the declara-
tion of emergency and there had been no agreement on the 1991 budget;
and action involved a joint venture with Mexico and it was necessary to
discuss matters with the United States Section's Mexican counterpart
before presenting data to anyone else.67
But the United States Section responded very much as it had in
the past, despite the fact that public consciousness of environmental and
health effects had changed. The press and local officials reacted to this
change, while the United States Section did not. And members of Arizo-
na's congressional delegation did not support the IBWC as they had pre-
viously either. Instead they became involved much more directly, often
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Arizona Daily Star, Feb. 20, 1992, at 1B, col. 1.
66, Arizona Daily Star, July 30,1992, at 1B, col. 1.
67. Interview with N. Gunaji, Comm'r, U. S. Section, IBWC, El Paso, Tx., Feb. 14, 1991.
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taking a more binational perspective than that espoused by the IBWC.
Members communicated with Mexico outside the IBWC framework,
including one United States Senator who wrote directly to the President of
the Republic of Mexico appealing for his help. 68 All of the delegation
members took positions in favor of greater United States government
involvement in preserving a clean border environment.
The increased congressional activism is not difficult to explain.
The number and influence of nongovernmental organizations interested
in the border and the environment had increased, partly as a function of
the free trade debate. Clearly, legislators did not want to base their envi-
ronmental records on what they could accomplish through the usual
channels with the IBWC. Further, congressional action on border projects
has become politicized. Instead of being a typical pork-barrel constituency
service, new wastewater treatment projects have become intertwined in
the free trade/environmental debate. The United States Section's reputa-
tion for nonpolitical professionalism was of little help in securing funding
for the latest proposed expansion of the Nogales international wastewater
treatment facility.
The United States Section of the IBWC is impeded from display-
ing greater environmental sensitivity by the narrow construction of its
mission. It seems doubtful that regulatory solutions and planning can be
avoided if border environmental health is to be protected, and yet the
United States Section is unlikely to change. As scholars explained in 1990,
[m]oving into the broader realm of environmental
management would engage the Commission, and the
United States Section, in the business of policing
domestic interests, which would provoke controversy.
It would raise the public profile of the Commission
and expose it to criticism, potentially undermining the
united front clientelism critical to its effectiveness as an
agency. The leadership of the United States Section
may not be willing to expose the agency, and the Com-
mission, to those risks.6 9
Unfortunately for the IBWC and its United States Section, the
Ambos Nogales experience suggests that remaining true to the old way is
no way to avoid criticism. If flexibility, sensitivity to public relations, and
heightened environmental consciousness is what will be necessary to
address border water problems in the future, then the recent responses of
the United States Section of the IBWC to the problems in Ambos Nogales
indicate that the agency will continue to fail. This should not be surprising
given that the literature on established bureaucracies suggests that it is
extremely difficult, if not foolhardy, to attempt to fundamentally and
68. Nogales Int'l, Nov. 7, 1990, at 11, col. 2.
69. Munme & Moore, supra note 4, at 683.
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TABLE 1. Past Characteristics of IWBC Decisionmaking
Past Characteristics of
IBWC Decisionmaking
Reactive
Technical expertise
Secrecy and closed decisionmaking
Biased toward physical solutions
Dependent upon federal action and
funding
Parallel national action and funding
communication to Mexico through
formal channels
Necessary Attributes of
Decisionmaking Arena
Anticipates problems prior to emergency
Social expertise
Open and participatory deliberation of
issues
Use of range of policy tools including
planning, regulation, and technology
transfer
Capable of negotiating and funding local
solutions
Binational action and expansion of
informal communication among local
officials
quickly change organizational perspectives and standard operating pro-
cedures.7
0
CONCLUSIONS
The left-hand column of Table 1 summarizes the past characteris-
tics of the United States Section of the IBWC which no longer serve to con-
tain conflict. The right-hand column lists attributes and institutional
arrangements that are more responsive to state and local interests, and
which the United States Section must have if it is to be successful in the
future:
The issue is whether or not the parallel national mode that in the
past was designed to preserve national sovereignty is adequate to resolve
problems in the future. Given the clear consequences of the past pattern,
we think not. As the Ambos Nogales case study illustrates, the United
States Section has failed to "solve" problems and failed to avoid conflict or
to build effective support. It is important for the United States Section to
be capable of not only planning the construction of projects, but also
responding to what will inevitably become more frequent on the border:
toxic spills, water shortages and droughts, health scares, etc. The institu-
70. B. Hogwood & B. Peters, The Pathology of Public Policy (1985);J. Wilson, Bureaucracy
(1989).
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tion must become skilled at working with the media and with public rela-
tions.
Even more fundamentally, institutional arrangements should be
capable of addressing water-related issues associated with population
and industrial growth. It should be possible to design policies that do not
subsidize waste generators by providing federal funding to clean up con-
taminated water. It would be better to attack the sources of the problems
by internalizing the costs of wastes in the rates charged for disposal. And
those who benefit from the low cost labor in Mexico should have some
responsibility for paying the costs of expanding water supply, wastewater
collection, and treatment systems.
The proposal to alter the design and mission of the IBWC, as
opposed to establishing entirely new institutions, certainly deserves more
debate. Yet several things seem certain. In the future, knowledge of the
social sciences, communication, and negotiation are likely to be more use-
ful than technical expertise in resolving border water problems. Secrecy
will only serve as a hindrance to long-range planning. Binational
approaches that include pollution prevention and planned growth will
require far greater state and local involvement.
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